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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
MARQUETTA CARZELL, LUELLA 
CARTER, and GLADYS CHEGE, On 
Behalf of Themselves and All Others 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
LIFE OF THE SOUTH INSURANCE ) 
CONWANYandmSURANCECOMPANY ) 
OF THE SOUTH, ) 
) 
) 
Similarly Situated, 
Plaintiffs, Civil Action File No. 2015CV264252 
v. 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Life of the South Insurance Company and 
Insurance Company of the South's (collectively "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss, or in the 
Alternative, for Judgment on the Pleadings. Defendants also submitted a Motion to Stay 
Discovery seeking a stay pending resolution of their Motion to Dismiss, but that motion is now 
moot as a result of this Order. Upon consideration of the motion and briefs submitted, the Court 
finds as follows: 
I. ALLEGATIONS 
Plaintiffs brought this purported class action on behalf of themselves and others who 
purchased insurance products related to installment loans. The insurance products, including 
life, disability, unemployment, death and dismemberment, and property (mainly, auto) insurance 
policies, were issued by Defendants Life of the South Insurance Company and Insurance 
Company of the South. However, the policies were sold to consumers (and sometimes required) 
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by installment lenders like non-party World Finance Corporation ("World"). Plaintiffs allege 
World acted as Defendants' agent in selling these policies and received a commission or 
"kickback." Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' insurance products were overpriced because 
Defendants paid these commissions or "kickbacks" to installment lenders like World out of the 
up-front premiums. For some insurance products, the commissions accounted for more than 
70% of the total premium assessed. The premiums were often financed as a part of the loan. 
Plaintiffs assert Defendants have violated the terms of the insurance contracts and 
Georgia's insurance laws. Specifically, they assert (1) Defendants have not paid refunds directly 
to customers when they renew their loans but instead apply the refunds to new insurance 
policies; (2) Defendants have set premiums that are not reflective of the values of the policies; 
and (3) Defendants have enforced unconscionable policies that provide worthless or redundant 
coverage (e.g. auto insurance policies for automobiles held as collateral for loans even though 
the automobile is fully covered under a separate policy). Finally, the Complaint alleges the 
insurance agreements are procedurally unconscionable because Defendants and their agents 
(including World) required borrowers to sign insurance contracts without an opportunity to 
review or negotiate the terms, added policies without the consumers' knowing consent, and made 
misrepresentations about the cost and benefits of the policies and whether the policies were 
optional. 
The purported class claims (1) breach of contract, including the coveriant of good faith 
and fair dealing, (2) unconscionability, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) negligence, and (5) bad faith. 
Plaintiffs seek relief including: actual, incidental, and punitive damages, disgorgement of all 
benefits derived by Defendants from members of the purported class, and a declaration that 
Defendants' practices are unlawful and should be enjoined. 
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II. STANDARD 
Defendants seek dismissal under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Alternatively, Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings under O.C.G.A. § 9-11- 
12( c). The granting of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is proper only where there is a 
complete failure to state a cause of action and the allegations make clear that the opposing party 
would not be entitled to judgment under any state of provable facts. See Holland Ins. Grp., LLC 
v. Senior Life Ins. Co., 329 Ga. App. 834,836 (2014). In deciding on a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, "all well-pleaded material allegations of the opposing party's pleading are to be 
taken as true, and all allegations of the moving party which have been denied are taken as false." 
Brathwaite v. Fulton-DeKalb Hasp. Auth., 317 Ga. App. 111, 112 (2012). Plaintiffs argue 
Defendants' inclusion on an affidavit in support of their Motion converts it to a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. However, the Court did not consider this Affidavit in its ruling. 
III. ANAL YSIS 
Defendants argue this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Filed Rate 
Doctrine. The Filed Rate Doctrine is a federal policy which "bars recovery by those who claim 
injury by virtue of having paid a filed rate." Taffe! v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1491 (11th 
Cir. 1992) (where the legislature authorized another to set a rate, "the rate-payer 'can claim no 
rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate"'). While originally a federal doctrine, the 
Georgia Supreme Court has recognized its applicability to state claims arising under limited 
circumstances. See Carr v . Southern Co., 263 Ga. 771 (1994). In the context of utility rates, the 
Georgia Supreme Court reasoned that since the General Assembly had given the Georgia Public 
Service Commission ("PSC") the exclusive power to determine what are just and reasonable 
utility rates, any rate which the PSC subsequently established would be considered a legislative 
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act that binds all parties as if the rate had been fixed by the General Assembly. See Carr, 263 at 
771 (citing Georgia Pub. Servo Comm 'n V. Atlanta Gas Light, 205 Ga. 863, 883 (1949)). Thus, a 
rate-payer has no legal right to a utility rate other than that established by the PSC, or filed by a 
utility and accepted by the PSC, and the Filed Rate Doctrine will bar any suit that seeks such 
recovery. See id. 
Georgia has not recognized the applicability of the Filed Rate Doctrine in the context of 
insurance rates. However, at this stage, it is unnecessary for the Court to consider whether the 
Filed Rate Doctrine applies to insurance rates, as this suit is not a simple "rate dispute." While it 
is true that Plaintiffs claim the Defendants' insurance products were overpriced due to the 
inclusion of kickback fees in the premiums, Plaintiffs allege that the contracts which govern the 
insurance policies were unconscionable and unenforceable due to Defendants' wrongful 
activities. These activities include the imposition and enforcement of unconscionable terms, the 
requirements that Plaintiffs purchase allegedly worthless insurance, and various misstatements 
and omissions regarding the appropriateness, necessity, and limitations of the insurance policies 
that were material to the transactions with Plaintiffs. As such, Plaintiffs are challenging 
allegedly deceptive sales practices and are not seeking a rate inconsistent with any filed rate. 
The Court finds that the Filed Rate Doctrine does not bar this suit for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Defendants further seek dismissal arguing that Plaintiffs have not exhausted their 
administrative remedies because the Commissioner has primary jurisdiction over this dispute. 
Defendants claim Plaintiffs, as ratepayers challenging the rate which they were charged, are 
required to pursue administrative remedies in front of the Insurance Commissioner before filing 
an action with the Court under O.C.G.A. §§ 33-2-1 et seq. However, parties alleging damages 
4 
resulting from an Insurance Code violation are not required to pursue administrative relief prior 
to filing a civil complaint when the legal action has already vested. See Provident Indemnity Life 
Ins. Co. v. James, 234 Ga. App. 403, 407 (1998) (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-2-25); Parris v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Ga. App. 522 (1997) (holding that a defendant's violation of the 
Insurance Code may result in tort liability when the plaintiff can demonstrate damages caused by 
the violation of a duty imposed by the Code); Homes of Ga., Inc. v. Humana Employers Health 
Plan, 282 Ga. App. 802, 805-06 (2006) (holding that alleging a violation of the Insurance Code 
does not require the exhaustion of "administrative remedies before pursuing a class action even 
though the complaint alleges Insurance Code Violations"). In Hunnicutt v. Ga. Power Co., the 
Georgia Court of Appeals stated: 
The mere existence of an ... administrative remedy does not, standing alone, 
afford a defendant an absolute defense to the institution of a legal action. 
Decisions to the effect that a failure to invoke administrative remedies precludes 
or renders premature a resort to the courts are based upon statutes which by 
express terms or necessary implication give to the administrative [agency] 
exclusive jurisdiction or which make the [pursuit of] exhaustion of administrative 
remedies a condition precedent to judicial action. A litigant is not required to 
[pursue] an optional administrative process before seeking redress to the courts. 
168 Ga. App. 525, 526 (1983). There is no Georgia statute or case law "from which it might be 
inferred that the [Insurance Commissioner] has exclusive or even primary jurisdiction" over such 
vested legal disputes. Id. The determination of whether a claim must first be brought through 
administrative channels depends upon the nature of the claim and the requested relief. Provident 
Indemnity Life Ins. Co., 234 Ga. App. at 407. 
Here, like in Provident Indemnity, the class has alleged Defendants committed various 
torts against them and they were damaged. While some of the tort claims are premised on 
violations of the Insurance Code, the common law claims asserted against Defendants are 
separate and distinct causes of action that may be pursued directly in court. Plaintiffs are not 
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required to seek administrative remedies in front of the Insurance of Commissioner prior to 
pursuing a class action before this Court. As such, Defendants' Motion is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this ().![) day of December, 2016. 
u erior Court of Fulton County 
Business Case Division 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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